

Subverting Windows Embedded CE 6 Kernel

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Speaker

Petr Matousek

- Before also known under the handle Ratter, member of 29A
- Author of WinCE.Dust, proof of concept WinCE PE EXE files infector
- Co-author of Hxdef, one of the most used rootkits in Windows NT world
- Team member of AML (advanced malware lab, known for Blue Pill virtualised rootkit) of COSEINC (www.coseinc.com)

Agenda


- 1 Introduction
- 2 Windows Embedded CE 6
- 3 Subverting the Kernel
- 4 Detection of Non-Standard Behaviour
- 5 Closing

- Basis for Windows Mobile 7
- Windows Mobile for Automotives
- ARM accounts 75% of embedded 32-bit RISC CPUs
- ARM as main platform Windows Mobile 7
- Techniques presented work on any platform
- Rootkit for Windows CE 5 already exists

- Kit that keeps you Root
- But we're in embedded world ...
- Kit that let's you do dirty things INVISIBLY
 - Hiding Files
 - Hiding Processes
 - Hiding Network connections
 - Hiding OS Database Entries

- Way to explore OS system design
- Rootkit techniques can be used in debugging
- Every system can be rootkited
- Every rootkit can be detected, but the detection method must be already there
- Because I've already written a virus -)

Virtual Memory Layout: Windows CE 5.0 vs. Windows Embedded CE 6.0



- 32MB Address Space VS 2GB Address Space
- 32 Processes VS 32K Processes
- Device.exe, filesystem.exe, GWES.exe in User Mode
VS
Device.exe, filesystem.exe, GWES.exe in Kernel Mode
- Better parameter validation during syscalls
- Per-process page and handle tables
- Code based security in the loader (signing)

SYSCALL DISPATCHING, NON-HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE5**USER MODE****COREDLL.DLL**

FindFirstFileW

```
MOV R12, SP
STMTD SP!, {R0,R1}
STMTD SP!, {R12,LR}
...
LDR R3, =0xF001DFF4
MOV LR, PC
BX R3
...
LDMFD SP, {SP,LR}
BX LR
```

FILESYS.EXE**KERNEL MODE****KERNEL****Prefetch Abort
Handler****Syscall
Dispatcher**
(SystemApiSets[])

Prefetch

Abort

Call

PSL

SYSCALL DISPATCHING, NON-HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE6

USER MODE

COREDLL.DLL

FindFirstFileW

```
MOV R12, SP
STMFID SP!, {R0,R1}
STMFID SP!, {R12,LR}
...
LDR R3, =0xF101DFF4
MOV LR, PC
BX R3
...
LDMFD SP, {SP,LR}
BX LR
```

Prefetch

abort

KERNEL MODE

KERNEL

Prefetch Abort
Handler

Syscall
Dispatcher
(SystemApiSets[])

FILESYS.EXE

● APIS in the kernel described by APISET and CINFO structs

```
typedef struct APISet {
    CINFO    cinfo; /* description of the API set */
    int      iReg;   /* registered API set index (-1 if not registered) */
} APISET;
typedef APISET *PAPISET;

typedef struct _CINFO {
    char      acName[4];          /* 00: object type ID string */
    uchar     disp;               /* 04: type of dispatch */
    uchar     type;               /* 05: api handle type */
    ushort    cMethods;           /* 06: # of methods in dispatch t..
    const PFNVOID *ppfnExtMethods; /* 08: ptr to array of methods ...
    const PFNVOID *ppfnIntMethods; /* 0C: ptr to array of methods ...
    const ULONGLONG *pu64Sig;      /* 10: ptr to array of method si...
    DWORD       dwServerId;        /* 14: server process id */
    PHDATA      phdApiSet;         /* 18: HDATA of API set */
    PFNAPIERRHANDLER pfnErrorHandler; /* 1C: ptr to the API s...
} CINFO;
typedef CINFO *PCINFO;
```

- SystemApiSets[] is a global array of CINFO structs

```
[APISET index=0] CINFO [Wn32] disp=3,type=0,cMethods=82,extmethods=80098c70,  
intmethods=80098e78,sigs=80099080,dwServerId=0  
[APISET index=1] CINFO [THRD] disp=2,type=1,cMethods=10,extmethods=800a3678,  
intmethods=800a3638,sigs=800a36b8,dwServerId=0  
...  
[APISET index=7] CINFO [W32H] disp=2,type=7,cMethods=10,extmethods=0,intmethods=0,  
sigs=0,dwServerId=ffffffff  
[APISET index=8] CINFO [FFEX] disp=2,type=8,cMethods=3,extmethods=0,intmethods=0,  
sigs=0,dwServerId=ffffffff
```

- OS and components can register their own API sets
- There are "prototype" (HANDLE-based) API sets

● Coredll.dll acts as a proxy

```
.text:10040120 FindNextFileW          ; CODE XREF: EnumUILanguagesW+D
.text:10040120                      ; DATA XREF: .pdata:10101278
.text:10040120
...
.text:10040120          MOV      R12, SP
.text:10040124          STMFDD  SP!, {R0,R1}
.text:10040128          STMFDD  SP!, {R12,LR}
...
.text:1004013C          LDR      R3, =0xF101DFF8
.text:10040140          MOV      LR, PC
.text:10040144          BX       R3
...
.text:1004015C          LDMFDD  SP, {SP,LR}
.text:10040160          BX       LR
.text:10040160 ; End of function FindNextFileW
```

● Branching to 0xF101DFF8 causes prefetch abort handler (permission fault, not translation fault) to fire up

pte: 1e2; virtual address [f1000000] : physical address [0] - READONLY, DOMAIN - 15


- Control transfer to `armtrap.s[PrefetchAbort()]`
- Decomposing to API set and API number and call `objdisp.c[ObjectCall()]`
- For non-HANDLE-based apis `SystemApiSets[]` is used
- API function (`pci->ppfnExtMethods[apiindex]`) is called

● HANDLE Struct

```
// HDATA object (one per object)
struct _HDATA {
    DLIST          pci;                // doubly linked list.
    PCCINFO        pci;                // handle server information
    LPVOID         pvObj;              // pointer to the real object
    DWORD          dwRefCnt;           // total ref count
    DWORD          dwData;             // per-object data
    PNAME          pName;              // Name of the object
    PNAME          psd;                // security descriptor
};
```

- For HANDLE-based apis handle is looked up in the handle table and proper API set is retrieved ((PHDATA *)->pci)
- ((PHDATA *)->pci->ppfnExtMethods[apiindex]) is called with the handle parameter replaced by (PHDATA *)->pvObj

SYSCALL DISPATCHING, HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE5



SYSCALL DISPATCHING, HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE6

USER MODE

COREDLL.DLL

FindNextFileW

```
MOV R12, SP
STMFDP SP!, {R0,R1}
STMFDP SP!, {R12,LR}
...
LDR R3, =0xF101DFF8
MOV LR, PC
BX R3
...
LDMFDP SP, {SP,LR}
BX LR
```

Prefetch

abort

KERNEL MODE

KERNEL

Prefetch Abort
Handler

Syscall
Dispatcher

(Handle->pci->ppfnExt
Methods[apiindex])

FILESYS.EXE

Kernel-Mode Hooks

- Classic API Set Functions Hook
- Prefetch Abort Hook

User-Mode Hooks

- Shim DLLs
- Source Code Hook
- Other "Hook"

Classic API Set Functions Hook

- Replace function pointers in CINFO struct
- Filesys.exe is in kernel so no more code injecting
- Easily detectable

SYSCALL CLASSICAL HOOKING, NON-HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE6**USER MODE****COREDLL.DLL**

FindFirstFileW

MOV R12, SP

STMFD SP!, {R0,R1}

STMFD SP!, {R12,LR}

...

LDR R3, =0xF101DFF4

MOV LR, PC

BX R3

...

LDMFD SP, {SP,LR}

BX LR

Prefetch

abort

KERNEL MODE**KERNEL**Prefetch Abort
HandlerSyscall
Dispatcher
(SystemApiSets[])

HOOK POINT

HOOK FUNCTION

FILESYS.EXE

Filter the Output

SYSCALL CLASSICAL HOOKING, HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE6**USER MODE****COREDLL.DLL**

FindNextFileW

MOV R12, SP

STMFD SP!, {R0,R1}

STMFD SP!, {R12,LR}

...

LDR R3, =0xF101DFF8

MOV LR, PC

BX R3

...

LDMFD SP, {SP,LR}

BX LR

Prefetch

abort

KERNEL MODE**KERNEL**Prefetch Abort
HandlerSyscall
Dispatcher(Handle->pci->ppfnExt
Methods[apiindex])

HOOK POINT

HOOK FUNCTION

FILESYS.EXE

Filter the Output

Prefetch Abort Hook

- Exploits the syscall implementation itselfs
- Creates own API Set with "hooking" functions
- Installs prefetch abort hook that redirects hooked APIs to "hooking" functions by changing the prefetch abort address

SYSCALL PREFETCH ABORT HOOKING, NON-HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE6**USER MODE****COREDLL.DLL**

FindFirstFileW

MOV R12, SP

STMFD SP!, {R0,R1}

STMFD SP!, {R12,LR}

...

LDR R3, =0xF101DFF4

MOV LR, PC

BX R3

...

LDMFD SP, {SP,LR}

BX LR

Prefetch


abort

KERNEL MODE**KERNEL****Hook Prefetch Abort
Handler**

HOOK POINT

**Prefetch Abort
Handler****Syscall Dispatcher
(SystemApiSets[])****HOOK FUNCTION****Syscall
Dispatcher
(SystemApiSets[])****FILESYS.EXE**Filter
the
Output

SYSCALL PREFETCH ABORT HOOKING, HANDLE BASED, FILESYSTEM, CE6




Shim DLLs

- Hooking method supported by the OS itself
- Loader loads "shim modules" for every loaded module

```
iesample.exe:5da0022  OpenKey HKLM\ShimEngine SUCCESS Key:d0151980
iesample.exe:5da0022  QueryValue HKLM\ShimEngine\GlobalEnable SUCCESS 0x1
iesample.exe:5da0022  CloseKey HKLM\ShimEngine SUCCESS Key:d0151980
iesample.exe:5da0022  OpenKey HKLM\ShimEngine\LPCRT.dll NOTFOUND
iesample.exe:5da0022  OpenKey HKLM\ShimEngine\iesample.exe NOTFOUND
iesample.exe:5da0022  OpenKey HKLM\ShimEngine\{all}.dll NOTFOUND
iesample.exe:5da0022  OpenKey HKLM\ShimEngine SUCCESS Key:d0151980
```

- Integrated facility for "hooking" exports

SYSCALL HOOKING, SHIM MODULES, CE6

Hiding Files

- We're interested in SH_FILESYS_APIS && HT_FIND API Sets

```
[SH_FILESYS_APIS]  
fc=8,sig=0xc53 - FindFirstFile  
    (ARG_I_WSTR, ARG_IO_PTR, ARG_DW)
```

```
[HT_FIND]  
fc=2,sig=0x803 - FindNextFile  
    (ARG_DW, ARG_O_PTR, ARG_DW)
```

- HT_FIND API Set is HANDLE based

Hiding Files

● FindFirstFile Hook

```
HANDLE my_FindFirstFile(LPCTSTR lpFileName, LPWIN32_FIND_DATA lpFindFileData, DWORD fsz)
{
    HANDLE r = call_old_FindFirstFile();

    if(is_current_process_root_process() || r == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
        return r;

    if(returned_file_name_contains_hide_mask())
    {
        if(!call_old_FindNextFile())
        {
            FindClose(r);
            return INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
        }
    }

    return r;
}
```

Hiding Files

● FindNextFile Hook

```
BOOL my_FindNextFile(HANDLE hFindFile, LPWIN32_FIND_DATA lpFindFileData, DWORD fsz)
{
    BOOL r;

    get_hdata_from_handle();
    get_old_FindNextFile_from_handle_pci();
    pvobj = get_ctx_from_hdata();

    if(is_current_process_root_process())
        return call_old_FindNextFile();

    for(r = call_old_FindNextFile();
        r && returned_file_name_contains_hide_mask();
        r = call_old_FindNextFile());

    return r;
}
```

Hiding Registry Items

- We're interested in SH_FILESYS_APIS API Set

```
[SH_FILESYS_API]  
fc=21,sig=0x908dd90800a - RegEnumValue  
    (ARG_DW, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PTR, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PDW,  
    ARG_IO_PDW, ARG_IO_PDW, ARG_O_PTR, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PDW)  
  
fc=22,sig=0x9908d90800a - RegEnumKeyEx  
    (ARG_DW, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PTR, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PDW,  
    ARG_IO_PDW, ARG_O_PTR, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PDW, ARG_O_PDW)
```

Hiding Registry Items

● RegEnumValue Hook

```
LONG my_RegEnumValue(HKEY hKey, DWORD dwIndex, LPWSTR lpValueName...
{
    LONG r;

    if(is_current_process_root_process())
        return call_old_RegEnumValue();

    // adjust index because hidden entries can be before the current index
    adjust_index_by_hidden_entries();

    for(;;)
    {
        r = call_old_RegEnumValue();
        if(r)
            return r;

        if(returned_value_name_contains_hide_mask())
            return r;

        dwIndex++;
    }
}
```

Hiding Registry Items

● RegEnumKeyEx Hook

```
LONG my_RegEnumKeyEx(HKEY hKey, DWORD dwIndex, LPWSTR lpName, DWORD cbNameIn...  
{  
    LONG r;  
  
    if(is_current_process_root_process())  
        return call_old_RegEnumKeyEx();  
  
    // adjust index because hidden entries can be before the current index  
    adjust_index_by_hidden_entries();  
  
    for(;;)  
    {  
        r = call_old_RegEnumKeyEx();  
        if(r)  
            return r;  
  
        if(returned_value_name_contains_hide_mask())  
            return r;  
  
        dwIndex++;  
    }  
}
```


Hiding Open Ports

- We're interested in AFD API Set

```
[AFD]
```

```
fc=3,sig=0x90804007 - Afd_Unknown -)
```

```
(ARG_DW, ARG_DW, ARG_I_PTR, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PTR, ARG_DW, ARG_O_PDW)
```

Hiding Open Ports

● AFD_Unknown Hook

```
DWORD my_Afd_Unknown(DWORD u1, DWORD u2, DWORD u3, DWORD u4, DWORD u5, DWORD u6, DWORD u7)
{
    DWORD r;

    if(is_current_process_root_process())
        return old_Afd_Unknown();
    r = old_Afd_Unknown();

    if(size_of_input_structure_doesnt_match())
        return r;

    switch(call_reason())
    {
    case MIB_TCP_TABLE:
    { // hide mib_tcptable }
    case MIB_UDPTABLE:
    { // hide mib_udptable }
    default: return r;
    }
    return r;
}
```

Hiding Processes

- Processes are linked in global double linked list

```
void hide_process()
{
    for(every_process_in_process_list())
    {
        if(process_is_nk())
            break;

        if(process_name_contains_hide_mask())
        {
            remove_from_double_linked_list();
        }
    }
}
```

Hiding Modules

- Modules are linked in per-process double linked list

```
void hide_our_module_from_nk()  
{  
    for(every_module_in_process_module_list())  
    {  
        if(module_name_contains_hide_mask())  
        {  
            remove_from_double_linked_list();  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Demo

- Detects API Set hooks by checking "where" API Set function pointers point to
- Detects process unlinking by comparing process handles in kernel handle table with global process list
- Not able to detect prefetch abort handler hooking method

- Works similar to Rootkit Revealer by microsoft
- Diffs the raw SD Card on-disk data with API output
- Contains built-in FAT filesystem code
- If file is on SD Card but not on API output it is hidden

- As Win32 counterparts FileMon and RegMon show accessed registry and filesystem entries
- Work by hooking common registry and filesystem APIs
- Rootkit-like behaviour for good purpose

● Windows Embedded CE 6 Dumping Utility

Dumps

- KDataStruct Table
- Kernel Memory Info
- API Sets (signatures included)
- Active Process (modules, threads, open handles, VirtualAddresses List)
- Page Tables

Demo

- Every system can be rootkited.
- Every rootkit can be detected.
- There are improvements in Windows CE Embedded 6 that inherently ease the rootkit development.
- Rootkits and Detectors have been for Windows CE Embedded 6 have been presented.
- Additional debugging software that can help finding rootkits have been presented.

Any questions?

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**Interested in Windows Mobile Rootkit and
Malware Training? -)**

**Interested to be my colleague? We are
HIRING ...**

Contact my Boss - thomas@coseinc.com

Thank you.